The Political Dynamics of Food Security and Land Reform in Zimbabwe: 2000 and Beyond

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KEYWORDS Food Security. ZIDERA. Colonialism. Fast Track Land Reform Programme. Agricultural Production

ABSTRACT There are mixed opinions regarding the impact of the Zimbabwe Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) on food security. It began in earnest in 2000. From year 2000, food security in Zimbabwe has been affected by a number of issues, which include drought, lack of expertise, un-availability of capital, inadequate and inappropriate equipment and related infrastructure (such as dams and irrigation equipment), policy inconsistency and conflicts. This paper seeks to analyse the political dynamics affecting food security in Zimbabwe since the implementation of the FTLRP. The concept of politics is analysed in relation to food security in Zimbabwe. Definitions of politics such as those provided by Lasswell, Easton and Hobbes are examined in relation to their applicability on the subject. This paper, therefore, attempts to answer the political questions of who, what, when and how with respect to food security. Data was gathered through documentary search, key informant interviews and observations.

INTRODUCTION

Food security is at the core of national planning. Food insecurity has the potential to destabilise nations and can, in extreme cases, lead to civil wars. Linked to the subject of food security is the issue of land ownership and control. Land is the primary means of production, and without its control, one cannot claim control over any form of investment. Land conflicts have been witnessed world-wide.

The land question is more pronounced in Africa given the history of colonialism. The colonial process was characterized with alienation of Africans from their land, especially in settler colonies like Kenya, South Africa and Zimbabwe. Land was important to the colonial governments because he who owned it had control over economic activities, such as mining, farming and urban development. Having failed to secure the second rand in Zimbabwe, the white colonial government led by the British South African Company (BSAC) focused its attention on land control, with agriculture becoming an important economic activity. Food production for both local and regional consumption became a strategic economic activity as the settlers faced intense competition from Africans.

In colonial and post-colonial times, Zimbabwe had a strong food industry that linked the productive farming sector to the agro-processing industries. However, the politics of land ownership, which had been haunting Zimbabwe since the end of colonial rule in 1980, heated up; this resulted in high profile and high intensity land occupations in 1998 (Moyo 2004: 202), led by the Svosve people in Marondera. The situation triggered massive nationwide land occupations, which culminated in the FTLRP. While the programme managed to resettle agitated and land hungry Zimbabweans, the nation was plunged into a long term depressed food crop production. Zimbabwe fell from being a net food exporter to a net food importer, and as the crisis deepened, a considerable percentage of the population had to survive on donor aid.

Objectives

Given the political dynamics at the time, this paper, which is based on critical analysis, seeks to determine the reasons why Zimbabwe fell from being the ‘bread-basket’ of Southern Africa to being a nation surviving on food imports and food donations. Also, the paper examines the different reasons proffered by the polarised academia as well as different economic and political sides in the country and puts forward an objective analysis of the national decline. The analysis is conducted based on the concept of politics given that all the land upheavals and food crop production issues were influenced by politics from the colonial to post-colonial times.
OBSERVATIONS AND DISCUSSION

The Concept of Politics in the Context of the Zimbabwean Land Issue

Politics is a very broad term, and attempts to define it have created more controversy than consensus. However, the most simple of all definitions was arguably put forward by Lasswell (1950), who stated that politics refers to “who gets what, when and how”. Easton (1957: 383) states that “the study of politics is concerned with understanding how authoritative decisions are made and executed for a society”. From the definitions given by Lasswell and Easton, one can conclude that politics is about the distribution of power and resources in any society, with both power and resources influencing each other. Those who have power may use it to acquire more resources, while those who control resources may use such wealth to gain political power. In such a situation, power and resources buttress each other, leading to political systems in which the powerful ones are in control of resources.

In his definition of human interactions, which can be seen as politics in practice, Hobbes (1651: 103) states as follows:

The final cause, end, or design of men ... in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, in which we see them live in Commonwealths, is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of war which is necessarily consequent, as hath been shown, to the natural passions of men when there is no visible power to keep them in awe, and tie them by fear of punishment to the performance of their covenants, and observation of those laws of nature.

According to Hobbes, politics can be seen as the high authority established by the voluntary will of the citizens in order to escape from the brutish state of nature. However, Hobbes does not state what happens when one political entity encroaches into another. By analysing Hobbes concept, one would observe that Europeans who came to Africa brought into action what Hobbes said in theory. Not recognising African sovereignty over its resources, they moved in with politics of plunder, a form of the Hobbesian state of nature. In Zimbabwe, land acquisition was done in a brutish manner, and this could have influenced the manner in which the reclamation was undertaken. The principle of the rule of law was set aside and politics took precedence. Issues of legalities were weighed against questions of legitimacy with respect to land ownership. The laws were to be later amended after politics had defined the course of action.

Politics, therefore, defines resource allocation and distribution in any given community. It also defines production and reproduction issues in a community. This was clearly the case in Zimbabwe during the colonial period, like in other African countries. Successive colonial regimes defined the allocation of resources, thereby actively defining the level of production among whites and blacks. For instance, various land ordinances and laws meant that Europeans got prime land, while blacks were condemned to reserves so as to create a cheap and sustainable pool of labour for the whites. The number of livestock to be owned was defined by the Land Husbandry Act (LHA) (1951) (Duggan 1980), and the movement of Africans between towns and rural areas was regulated. The reason for these political regulations even in matters thought to be very private was the desire by colonial regimes to create a white elite and superior class by expropriating black labour and resources. Issues and myths such as the laziness of Africans, Africans being poor farmers and the superiority of Europeans were creations of politics.

History of Food Crop Production in Zimbabwe

Colonialism came with an unintended benefit to the indigenous people of Zimbabwe. This blessing was the realization that Africans had the potential to produce food crops for commercial purposes. Machingaidze (1979) and Lopcke (1985) note that when the whites took over the country and concentrated on mining, there was a boom in African food crop production as blacks saw an economic nitch in producing for the mining sector to pay for taxes imposed by the colonial regime and also to advance their livelihoods and lifestyles. This was one of the signs that showed the colonialists that Africans had potential to develop in line with the challenges and opportunities that the environment presented. However, this development potential was de-
stroyed by segregative colonial land and agricultural policies as well as legislations that promoted the development of the white race at the expense of the Africans in order to perpetuate colonialism. Africans did not only lose their land, but also their market share due to the colonial segregative policies.

Africans in Zimbabwe, even prior to colonialism, had always been great farmers, as noted by both black and white historians. In pre and early colonial times, “African farmers were farming extensively using a system of rotational cultivation” (Kramer 1997: 159). This shifting cultivation was not barbarism as portrayed by some European supremacists who were bent on vilifying anything African (Kramer 1997: 159). Lord Hailey, quoted in Allan (1960: 612), stated as follows: “Shifting cultivation is less a device of barbarism than a concession to the nature of the soil.” This method meant that while there were low yields per area cultivated, the cultivation of relatively large portions meant that enough yields for subsistence and surplus would be realized.

The conquest of Zimbabwe was driven by the myth of the second rand. It, therefore, followed that in the early years of colonialism, the settlers concentrated on developing mines and speculated on finding larger mineral deposits, primarily gold. The creation of the mines without active white participation in the farming sector saw Africans filling the gap of the increased demand for food crops, specifically maize, in the mines. African production increased steadily from the time of occupation until around 1905, during which the settlers concentrated more on finding the second rand (Lopcke 1985: 9; Machingaidze 1979: 2). Political push and pull factors contributed to the increase in African productivity. The push factor is related to the new taxes that had been imposed on Africans by the colonists. The new colonial regime imposed upon Africans a number of taxes, including hut tax, cattle tax, dog tax and even bicycle tax (Magirosa 2014). The tax regime was meant to create finances for the company in its day to day administration of the colony as well as push Africans to conform to the new capitalist mode of production and open room for their (Africans) exploitation. Africans had the options of either working for the settlers for a certain period of time to pay the taxes or pay in cash. As they despised the labour form, Africans increased their productivity in order to meet their tax requirements. Kramer (1997: 160) stated as follows: “Not only were peasants competent farmers but they were quick to respond to the new demands made on them for agricultural produce by the opening of the mines. Tax obligations were also met through sale of foodstuffs and cattle rather than by the sale of labour.” Later on after the creation of reserves and given the options of either migrating to the reserves or pay land rent/tax, Africans who had stayed at white partitioned lands had to produce more to pay for the rent, rather than work for the white settler as a means of paying the rent.

Besides the push factor, Africans also found opportunities to develop their livelihoods, hence the pull factor. Colonialism came with technical developments, such as the ox-drawn plough and other household goods, which attracted Africans. In order to acquire such goods from various traders, Africans had to produce grains or cattle to sell or barter for the goods. This desire to acquire the household goods led Africans to increase their production for commercial purposes.

The failure of the second rand mythology saw the BSAC rethinking its land policy after 1905. Blake (1977: 93) notes that farming “was not to play any significant part in the settler economy until 1896 at the earliest.” Blake’s (1977) assertion could have been driven by the historical developments which saw Europeans expropriating more African land after the end of the 1896-97 Chimurenga/Umvukela in the colony, using the principle of the right of conquest. In support of this assertion, Machingaidze (1979: 2) notes as follows:

The post-1908 period up to the beginning of World War I has been depicted by Palmer as the phase of the ‘white agricultural policy’, different from the period prior to it in that it marked the time during which the BSA Co. systematically implemented its new policy of promoting settler farming, settlement and agrarian production. The burial of the ‘second rand’ myth thus gave settler agriculture a tremendous boost as the Company began to focus its attention on agricultural development and the realization of “its” land asset.

The timing of the Europeans’ decision to establish an agricultural policy is not of great
interest to this research. Suffice to say, from the mid to the end of the first decade of the 20th century, the colonial regime took deliberate policies to promote settler agriculture. These policies had far reaching negative impacts on African peasants who had already established viable farming ventures in response to the push and pull drives brought about by colonialism.

The colonial regime went on to enact land and labour laws that limited the participation of Africans in the agricultural sector to mere peasantry for subsistence and created a labour pool for the farms and urban industries. The most notorious of these acts were the Land Appropriation Act (LAA) of 1930 and the Maize Control Act (MCA) of 1931, with the amended version of the same law (MCA) coming in 1934. The battle for markets and labour between the settler and Africans was captured by Vickery (1985: 217) as follows:

In such areas of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, African peasant producers responded with alacrity to early marketing opportunities. This conflicted with the interests of white farmers, who wanted the land and the markets, and white employers, who wanted Africans as low-wage workers, not independent producers. Europeans used the instruments of political power, which they dominated to apply to African peasants what Palmer (following an early official) calls the ‘squeezing-out process.’

Much has been written on the segregative nature of the LAA. One may think that the LAA was an attempt to destroy the African race by the Europeans, especially given that the reserves to which Africans were allocated were not fit for human habitat. The Gwaai and Shangani reserves were wastelands, which the Ndebeles looked to as graveyards. The reserves in Gokwe and Muzarabani were infested by tsetse-fly and received little rainfall, making them simply wastelands. This paper argues that, to the contrary, Europeans never sought to destroy the African race in the colony. Whites knew very well that they needed Africans more than Africans needed them. Europeans needed African labour to develop their enterprises in agriculture, mining and, later, manufacturing. They also badly needed African taxes to finance the administration of the colony (Lopcke 1985: 15-16). It is because of this reason that laws were promulgated gradually to achieve the different needs of the settlers as and when they arose. In this respect, the LAA was promulgated to deal with the needs of the whites with respect to drastically limiting the competition that was coming from African agriculture, specifically relating to maize, by removing Africans from fertile land and settling them in lands that were infertile, unsuitable for animal husbandry (as was the case with the reserves in Gokwe and Muzarabani), and far away from the railway line, which was very important as the most cheap and reliable mode of transport. This process would then lead to the achievement of the second goal: proletarianization of Africans and creating a sustainable cheap labour pool for the mines, farms and manufacturing industries in urban areas.

To put this argument in perspective, it can be argued that the LAA did not really bring much new concepts on land demarcations in the colony. The policy of reserves was first put in place in 1894 through the creation of the Gwaai and Shangani reserves in Matabeleland through the Matabeleland Orders in Council of 1894. Following the Orders in Council were the Southern Rhodesia Orders in Council (1898) and the Private Locations Ordinance (1908) (Rennie 1978), among a raft of provisions that were meant to promote white settlement and agriculture in the colony. By around 1905, long before the promulgation of the LAA in 1930, there were around sixty established reserves on about 22 percent of the landmass of the colony (Embassy of Zimbabwe in Washington DC, online, www.zimbassyc.gov.zw/index.php/2014-12-15-10-06-42/2014-12-16-09-53-10?showall=1&limitstart=). It is because of this reason that this paper argues that the LAA (1930) was simply a legal formalization of land occupation and ownership between blacks and whites since separation had already been instituted by different Ordinances and Orders in Council as well as informal land grabs. This argument is also proven by the fact that the LAA (1930) in its definition of a reserve states that “Reserve means land set apart for the use and occupation of natives by the Southern Rhodesia Order-in-Council, 1920, or any amendment thereof.” It makes reference to different colonial government notices and the Private Locations Ordinance (1908) enacted and promulgated before it.
The second notorious law that destroyed African agriculture was the MCA of 1931 and its 1934 amendments. Lopcke (1985: 13) notes that white farmers had been lobbying the colonial regime to regulate the maize market from as early as 1924. This proves that Africans had been great farmers who had given Europeans a torrid competition since the early years of colonialism in Zimbabwe, hence the resort to political power to squeeze-out African competition. However, the government only responded to the calls of regulating the maize market after the colony was hit by the aftershocks of the Great Depression of 1929-39, as noted by Lopcke (1985: 13):

After the maize price on the world market dropped tremendously in 1930 (from 10s to 4s 3d a bag) the Rhodesian Agricultural Union fully committed itself to maize interests and actively entered politics to press for maize control. The outcome of the activities was the Maize Control Act of 1931.

The MCA (1931) created the Maize Control Board (Madimu 2017), which had a monopoly on maize transactions. Maize produce was also grouped into two categories/pools. The first pool encompassed settler produced maize, while African maize always fell into the second pool, which fetched less income even if it had a higher quality.

The last of the major steps that were taken by the colonial regime to destroy African agriculture and prop up settler agriculture that is analyzed by this paper is the cheap financing and subsidy policy on settler agriculture, which was done through the Land Bank. The Land and Agricultural Bank had been established in 1924 to provide credit to settler farmers. The bank, in some cases through the Maize Control Board, extended cheap long term loans to settlers for crop production and farm development. This insulated settler agriculture against Africans who could not compete given the unfair advantage that settlers were now enjoying.

The net effect of the settler and colonial policies on land and agriculture, as shown in this section, was the destruction of the rising and thriving African agriculture. The section notes that the reasons for the destruction of African agriculture were the political needs of the colony, including the need to create a sustainable labour pool for European enterprises in agriculture, mining and, later, manufacturing in urban areas. The development of African agriculture had been pushed by the need to pay taxes without using the grueling option of ‘chibaro’ labour and the pull factors of the need to acquire household and capital goods that came with the introduction of colonialism. These developments created serious competition for settler agriculture, leading to laws and policies that destroyed African agriculture and enhanced settler agriculture, specifically maize production. In short, Africans were great farmers whose mythical failure was a deliberate creation of the colonial state to justify colonialism in general and expropriation of African land in particular.

The First Land Reform and the Rise of the Communal and Small Holder Food Crop Producers

As asserted earlier, indigenous Africans in colonial Zimbabwe were successful farmers whose failure was premeditated and systematically constructed by successive colonial regimes. At independence, the new majority black government sought to bring back Africans into farming through the land reform and resettlement programme. The struggle for independence had been primarily based on land ownership and control. With the support of international partners, mainly the erstwhile colonial master, Britain, the government successfully implemented the land reform, which saw 71 000 households benefitting mainly from A1 small holder model plots/farms (Government of Zimbabwe 2001). The programme was a full package that saw targeted farms developed in terms of infrastructure and social amenities.

Given that the programme was aimed at reducing poverty and economically empowering the new farmers through commercial production, the resettled farmers were trained in best agricultural practices that were affordable. The government also introduced input loan schemes and grants. Further, agricultural extension workers/officers were deployed in different wards to assist with on-the-field training, while veterinary officers were deployed to deal with livestock diseases and control. The net result of the government’s efforts was an increase in food crop and livestock production. This boom saw the
The FTLRP and the fall in Food Crop Production: Understanding the Nexus

During the FTLRP, there was a sudden decline in food crop production. A number of reasons have been proffered to explain the sudden decline, which coincided with the FTLRP. Some of the reasons that were put forward include the recurrent droughts that have bedeviled Zimbabwe since 2000, ‘illegal’ economic sanctions and a shift from food crop production to cash crop production by farmers.

This paper established that a plethora of reasons contributed to the fall in food crop production. One of the major reasons for the fall, which was established by the research, is the migration from food crop production to cash crop production by the traditional food crop producers, namely the beneficiaries of the first phase of the land reform programme under the A1 scheme, communal farmers and small scale holder farmers. After the displacement of the white commercial farmers who had traditionally produced cash crops, these traditional food crop producers found a vacuum which they sought to fill with increased earnings per hectare?

The major cash crops that the black farmers migrated to include tobacco, paprika as well as horticultural products like tomatoes. Prior to 2000, white commercial farmers dominated tobacco production with over 90 percent of the marketed crop, while black farmers, who consisted mainly of the small holders, the A1 and communal farmers, had less than 10 percent of production.3 After the year 2000 and the promulgation of the FTLRP, government policy scrapped classification of farmers in terms of commercial farmers and others and ushered in new classifications of A1, A2, small holder commercial and communal farmers. This was meant to deal with the racial connotations that were brought about by the earlier classification.4 The FTLRP saw the number of tobacco growers increase from 1 547 in 1980 to 8 537 in 2000 at the dawn of land occupations and the Fast Track Land Reform Programme; the number skyrocketing to 75 538 in 2015.

The increase in the number of registered tobacco growers was initially accompanied by a fall in production. This phenomenon was followed by a fluctuating depressed production from 2003 to 2009 before a steady sustainable increase from 2010 to 2015. The initial fluctuations are explained by the fact that tobacco is a technical crop whose production is demarcated by technical phases, including monitoring the seedbed, field stage, curing and bailing stages. Many blacks who ventured into tobacco production went in without the technical knowhow and took time to learn how to produce quality crop with high yields. This was at a time when the former white commercial farmers who enjoyed a near monopoly of production were being moved off the land. Another explanation in relation to the rise in black tobacco farmers is that the country slid gradually into an economic crisis in the 1996/7/8 period5 whose effects became more pronounced in the post 2000 era, specifically in 2007/8, due to a plethora of reasons. The crisis led to hyper-inflation, which peaked at more than 50 billion percent (Frisby 2016), and lack of inputs and finance to undertake farming, not only tobacco but also food crops.

In contrast, food crop production, dominated by maize as shown by deliveries to the Grain Marketing Board (GMB), fell from over a million metric tonnes in the pre-1996/97 season to 154 847 tonnes during the 2001/02 season, at the eve of the promulgation of the FTLRP, but with farm occupation already underway. The maize deliveries crashed to 49 418 tonnes in the 2002/03 season. It resurged from 2003/4 to 2007/8, fluctuating close to 200 000 metric tonnes, which was far below the value of a million metric tonnes at the peak of production and also far below the national annual demand of approximately two million metric tonnes each year (Zaba 2013; Maponga and Chikwati 2014; AFP 2016).

The fall, as initially noted, was driven by the shift from food crop production to cash crop production by the small holder black farmers. The migration was driven by the comparative returns from the crops. As earlier noted, after the first phase of the land reform, the government came up with initiatives to increase maize production. These initiatives included active extension workers who assisted farmers in monitoring their crops, training programmes in the
production of food crops and livestock rearing, input loan schemes and timely payment for produce delivered to the GMB. However, in the post 2000 era, with the economic challenges that were biting the country, the visibility of extension workers became thinner, while government training programmes were either reduced or dropped. The government input schemes under GMB were dropped and replaced by political input schemes, such as the Presidential Input and Support Scheme. The political input schemes were marred by corruption, allegations of politicization and late disbursement. As drought and food shortages became more entrenched, some beneficiaries of inputs started converting seed maize, sugar beans and cow peas for consumption, while fertilizers were sold in order for people to purchase food.

Added to the migration from food crops to cash crops by the traditional food crop producers is the issue of recurrent droughts. While droughts have always been a part of the climate of the country at known intervals, at the turn of the 21st century, rainfall patterns changed drastically since the 2002/3 season, according to the Department of Meteorological Services. Some local scholars have attributed these droughts to climate change, which is a phenomenon that is still under research locally, regionally, and internationally.

However, it should also be conceded that while black small holder farmers produced the bulk of the maize, white commercial farmers also produced considerable quantities of food crops. However, some of the produce were not sold through the GMB; these farmers sold to private players like Agrifoods and National Foods for processing into human and animal feeds. Some white commercial farmers processed the produce into animal feed for their livestock. The displacement of the white commercial farmers, through land occupations, means that the FTLFP was undertaken without properly analyzing its negative implications. One of these negative implications is the subsequent subtraction of the production percentage by the white commercial farmers.

Vandalism also impacted negatively on farm production, with food crops being the hardest hit. The manner in which the FTLRP was undertaken was through ordinary people occupying the farms. The gap between the deployment of government officials and law enforcement agents gave a window period for opportunists to take advantage of the chaos to vandalise irrigation equipment, roofing materials of tobacco bans and other sheds, and tillage equipment like tractors. The government has not been able to come up with the total cost of the equipment lost due to vandalism. However, in total, the cost could also be felt from the fact that irrigation equipment which could have assisted in keeping the production of food crops high were no longer available, and lands that were, prior to the FTRLP, under irrigation were turned into dry farming lands, hence denying the nation of the high yields that are related to irrigated crops.

The last subject of discussion in this sub-section is the impact of sanctions. The paper notes that sanctions on Zimbabwe have been a controversial topic, with different constituencies inside and outside the country giving different interpretations. The issue of sanctions on Zimbabwe is broad and very much outside the scope of this research. However, given the impact the subject has had on the declining economic fortunes of Zimbabwe, with agriculture being one of the hardest hit sectors, this paper discusses it since sanctions were influenced and later affected the FTLRP.

Chingono (2010: 67) notes that the land question was the trigger that led the ZANU PF government to fall out of favour with the Western powers, pointing out that while the issue was internationalized and sanctions imposed on the basis of lack of democracy and human rights, these governance rhetoric were only meant to legitimize the sanctions as they could not be legitimately slammed based on the land question.

While the ZANU PF led Zimbabwean government strongly protests the sanctions, arguing that the nation has been suffering from ‘illegal sanctions’ because the measures were not mandated by the United Nations (UN), opposition elements in Zimbabwe led by Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and western countries, among them the United States of America (USA), the European Union (EU) and Australia, argue that the sanctions are targeted at ZANU PF officials, individuals and entities that fuel the machinery that oppress citizens in Zimbabwe. A closer look at the sanctions regime shows that the most damaging sanction to the
Zimbabwean economy and, hence, agricultural development is the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA) (2001) of the USA. Section 4 (c) of ZIDERA (2001) states as follows:

"Until the President makes the certification described in subsection (d), and except as may be required to meet basic human needs or for good governance, the Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States executive director to each international financial institution to oppose and vote against— (1) any extension by the respective institution of any loan, credit, or guarantee to the Government of Zimbabwe; or (2) any cancellation or reduction of indebtedness owed by the Government of Zimbabwe to the United States or any international financial institution."

Subsection (d) reads as follows:

A certification under this subsection is a certification transmitted to the appropriate congressional committees of a determination made by the President that the following conditions are satisfied:

1. **RESTORATION OF THE RULE OF LAW**—The rule of law has been restored in Zimbabwe, including respect for ownership and title to property, freedom of speech and association, and an end to the lawlessness, violence, and intimidation sponsored, condoned, or tolerated by the Government of Zimbabwe, the ruling party, and their supporters or entities.

2. **ELECTION OR PRE-ELECTION CONDITIONS**—Either of the following two conditions is satisfied: (A) **PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION**—Zimbabwe has held a presidential election that is widely accepted as free and fair by independent international monitors, and the president-elect is free to assume the duties of the office. (B) **PRE-ELECTION CONDITIONS**—In the event the certification is made before the presidential election takes place, the Government of Zimbabwe has sufficiently improved the pre-election environment to a degree consistent with accepted international standards for security and freedom of movement and association.

3. **COMMITMENT TO EQUITABLE, LEGAL, AND TRANSPARENT LAND REFORM**—The Government of Zimbabwe has demonstrated a commitment to an equitable, legal, and transparent land reform program consistent with agreements reached at the International Donors’ Conference on Land Reform and Resettlement in Zimbabwe held in Harare, Zimbabwe, in September 1998.

Based on the quoted subsections of ZIDERA (2001), it is noteworthy that while the issues of human rights and democracy were included, a major influence on the enactment of the law was the FTLRP. It is because of this reason that the act refers to the International Donors’ Conference on Land Reform and Resettlement of 1998, which was the last dash by the Zimbabwe government outside the draft constitution that had compulsory land acquisition clause to have a properly planned land reform programme that took into account the need to redress colonial land imbalances while allowing white commercial farmers to remain with considerable land in line with the Lancaster House agreements, which Britain had reneged on. However, it is important to note that while government had extended this goodwill gesture, the international community as well as local and international financial institutions frowned at it given that from a target of 42 billion Zimbabwean dollars which the government needed to resettle 100 000 families, only seven million three hundred and thirty nine thousand Zimbabwean dollars (ZW$ 7 339 000, 00) was pledged by attendees comprising 48 countries and international organizations (Simura 2009: 31).

The net effect of ZIDERA and other western sanctions is that Zimbabwe failed to access line of credit, which were not only important for the government in its support to the newly resettled farmers, but also to the private producers of fertilizers, chemicals and farming equipment. While it was argued that the sanctions were targeted, a closer look at the individuals and entities that were on the sanctions lists by the USA’s Office of Foreign Accounts Control (OFAC) and the EU list shows that the targeted entities would result in an economic nosedive that would be detrimental to agricultural production, especially food crops that were mainly meant for internal consumptions, hence fetching little prices compared with cash crops. These individuals and entities included Industrial Development Corporation Of Zimbabwe Ltd, Infrastructure Development Bank Of Zimbabwe, Minerals Marketing Corporation Of Zimbabwe, ZB...
Financial Holdings Limited, Intermarket Holdings Limited, Scocfin Limited, Zimbabwe Iron And Steel Company, and Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation as well as several farms.

Sanction had also the effect of fuel shortages in the country. The role of fuel in agricultural and economic development cannot be overemphasized. Fuel powers the equipment in industries that produce the needed farming implements and inputs and also the farm machinery. Fuel shortages, therefore, either reduced production or increased the costs of production when sourced from the informal market.

CONCLUSION

This paper attempted to analyze the relationship between food security and land reform in Zimbabwe. The paper was inspired by the desire to answer questions that rose after the FTLRP, with respect to the suggestion that the policy destroyed a thriving farming industry, especially by driving out white commercial farmers, who are alleged to be very experienced in farming, and replacing them with inexperienced Africans. In order to come up with objective answers, the paper traced the history of food crop production in particular and farming in general from colonial times to the first post-independence land reform and resettlement programme. It ended by analyzing the nexus between FTLRP and food crop production.

It was noted that Africans were great farmers who proved their prowess by giving settler farmers stiff competition, especially in the production of maize. The great strides that Africans achieved were undone by the introduction of colonial agricultural and land laws and policies that favoured settler agriculture at the expense of Africans and actively destroyed African farmers. These policies were instrumental in creating a myth that Africans were poor farmers and that Europeans were expert farmers. In post-colonial Zimbabwe, the government embarked on the land reform and resettlement programme, which saw Africans receiving land, mostly small holder plot that averaged seven hectares through the Lancaster House agreement of the willing buyer – willing seller policy. Under this programme, Africans who got a number of government support and training proved, as was the case during the early years of colonialism, that they were good farmers. White commercial farmers retreated mostly to cash crop production, especially tobacco and horticulture as well as cattle production, while Africans took the burden of food crop production. African production gradually rose to the point of contributing more than seventy percent of maize that was delivered to the GMB at the eve of the FTLRP.

As noted in the last section, there was a coincidental decline in food security in the country with the advent of the FTLRP. This section deconstructed the myth that the food insecurity that came in the post 2000 era was primarily and directly due to the implementation of the FTLRP. While the programme had a proportional direct impact, it was not responsible for the rest due to the fact that African production of the staple food (that is maize) had surpassed white commercial production. The direct impact was due to the displacement of white commercial farmers who were into food crop production as well as the vandalism that took place during the FTLRP. Irrigation and production infrastructure were destroyed as a means to spite white commercial farmers by land occupiers and also as a result of premeditated criminal activities by those who stole the equipment for resell. This means that other factors were responsible. As noted in the paper, these factors included recurrent droughts, sanctions, and unfriendly maize marketing policies, which led to the migration to cash crop production by Africans. The net effect of these factors is that Zimbabwe’s agricultural industry fell to its knees, and there was food insecurity. There was also a ripple effect of the fall of the upstream and downstream of the agro-industry, and a cycle of destruction followed. Some government interventions failed to resuscitate the industry due to droughts, politicization of intervention and corruption among those involved in the process.

NOTES

1 Machingaidze (1979) notes that the colonial government, besides being served by African cheap labour, was also substantially subsidised by the Africans through a system of exorbitant taxes. He gives the instances of 1909 and 1910 in which the BSAC’s Lands Department collected 18,653 pounds and 35,422 pounds, respectively. Of the 209,423 pounds collected from Africans taxes and different fees the
native department had an expenditure budget of 52 640 pounds, with the rest going to national coffers and in most cases used as cheap loans to settle
2 Interview with Bernard Mache, (Director in the Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation and Irrigation Development), Harare, 19 January 2017.
3 Interview with Zimbabwe Tobacco Industries and Marketing Board (TIMB) Director Technical Services, Meanwell Gudu, Harare, 19 December 2016
4 Interview with Meanwell Gudu.
5 1996 was the first year in which Zimbabwe was denied multilateral funding/assistance by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). There has been divergent explanations to the real reasons why the support was frozen. The ZANU PF led government's explanation had been that the IMF was enraged by Zimbabwe's suspension of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) which it (IMF) had sponsored. The Zimbabwean government argued that the policy was destructive to the livelihoods of majority of poor people. The opposing view is that Zimbabwe had fallen into arrears on its debt repayment, hence it was no longer eligible for the support. In 1997, the Zimbabwean government paid gratuities amounting to ZWS 50 000 to each of the veterans of the second Chimurenge (liberation struggle), whose number could be estimated at 50 000. Politically, there was no problem; economically, the funds had not been budgeted. The payment triggered an instant economic shockwave that saw the Zimbabwe Stock market crashing and wiping away 46% from the value of shares as investors scrambled out of the Zimbabwe dollar of its value and the Zimbabwean dollars losing more than 70% of its value against the US dollar (Mambondiani: 2007; Marawanyika: 2007; The Herald Business Desk: 2014). The day is remembered in economic corridors as the 'Black Friday'. At the same time, the government undertook a military intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which angered western capitals who were alleged to have had vested interests in the conflict through the extraction of conflict resources. This period saw the country losing western support, and this growing animosity without an alternative back-up laid the foundations for the economic slump.
6 Interview with Bernard Mache, (Director in the Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation and Irrigation Development), Harare, 19 January 2017
7 This was the dominant view and characterization of the Presidential Wellwishers Input Scheme by respondents selected from six provinces.
8 One farmer from Murewa District noted that, “Mbeu yechibage yaigezwa yonani kwa kiti ome vanhu vonogaisa hupfu (literally translated to: people would clean the chemical preservatives off the maize seed by washing it and dry it before grinding it to mealie meal).”
9 Section 3 of ZIDERA states that, “In this Act: (1) … The term “multilateral development banks” means the international development banks and the International Monetary Fund. (2) … The term “multilateral development banks” means the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Development Association, the International Finance Corporation, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the Inter-American Investment Bank, the African Development Bank, the African Development Fund, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency.

REFERENCES


